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1 Introduction
Recent empirical research on foreign direct investment and exchange rate uncertainty has
highlighted the ambiguous eﬀects of exchange rate volatility on FDI. Cushman (1985) and
Cushman (1988) found evidence of a positive relationship between US FDI and exchange
rate uncertainty, whereas B´ enassy-Qu´ er´ e, Fontagn´ e and Lahr` eche-Revil (2001) show that
exchange rate volatility in emerging economies has a negative impact on OECD outward
foreign direct investment (FDI) to these countries. Cushman (1985) shows that exchange
rate risk may increase direct investment bilateral ﬂows between the US and Canada,
France, Germany, Japan and the UK, whilst Cushman (1988) ﬁnds an analogous relation-
ship between exchange rate risk and inward US FDI. In both papers, Cushman develops a
mean-variance framework in which a ﬁrm’s utility is a positive function of expected proﬁt
and a negative function of the variance of proﬁt. The latter derives solely from exchange
rate risk. FDI is mainly determined by the host country’s relative factor cost competi-
tiveness, which is inﬂuenced by exchange rate volatility. The importance of exchange rate
risk depends on whether the ﬁrm produces domestically or abroad, and on the share of
imported inputs in production. Although Cushman attempts to apply conventional port-
folio theory to the analysis of US foreign direct investment, none of the models presented
in Cushman (1985) and Cushman (1988) considers that a risk-averse ﬁrm would try to
minimize the variance of its total proﬁt by exploiting the correlation between exchange
rate movements. B´ enassy-Qu´ er´ e, Fontagn´ e and Lahr` eche-Revil (2001) extend Cushman’s
work and investigate the role of exchange rate correlation on foreign direct investment from
OECD countries into developing economies. In B´ enassy-Qu´ er´ e, Fontagn´ e and Lahr` eche-
Revil (2001) the typical investing ﬁrm is a multinational producing abroad and exporting
from there to the home country. Its location choice will be determined by the potential
host relative competitiveness, which is proxied by the relative real exchange rate of the
potential host against the investor’s real exchange rate. An increase in competitiveness
is measured by the depreciation of the host country’s currency. Their empirical analysis
indicates that, irrespective of the sign of exchange rate correlation between alternative
locations, inward FDI to one country decreases if the competitiveness of an alternative
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1host rises.
In this paper, we investigate the role of exchange rate risk diversiﬁcation as a determinant
of the location of US FDI in Europe. We apply standard portfolio theory to the q theory
of investment to show that risk-averse ﬁrms can reduce the negative impact of exchange
rate ﬂuctuations on their proﬁts by diversifying their investment across two alternative lo-
cations in a single market. Unlike Cushman (1985), Cushman (1988) and B´ enassy-Qu´ er´ e,
Fontagn´ e and Lahr` eche-Revil (2001), we focus on the impact of exchange rate risk on
foreign direct investment, conditional on the rate of return, and assume that ﬁrm-level
speciﬁcities-e.g., competitive factor costs- are captured by the proﬁts reported by aﬃli-
ates. B´ enassy-Qu´ er´ e, Fontagn´ e and Lahr` eche-Revil (2001) and Cushman (1985) assume
ﬁrms are perfectly competitive. On the contrary, we consider that ﬁrms are imperfectly
competitive, since there is ample theoretical and empirical evidence that market power
moderates the negative impact of exchange rate volatility on domestic investment. We
are not aware of any analysis of the interaction between market power and exchange rate
volatility in the case of inward or outward foreign direct investment, and thus extend the
works of,among others, Campa and Goldberg (1995), ?) and Nucci and Pozzolo (2001).
Following this introduction, Section 2 presents the theoretical framework that will be
estimated in Section 3, and discusses measures of industrial concentration. Section 3
shows the results of the panel data estimation. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
A ﬁrm chooses investment in locations A and B to maximize the present value of the





¡rt[U(E[(¼(:)];V ar[¼(:)]) ¡ C(IA;IB) ¡ IA ¡ IB]dt (1)
where E[¼(:)] and V ar[¼(:)] are the expected value of proﬁts and the variance of proﬁts
respectively. We assume the ﬁrm is risk-averse, so U(E[¼(:)];V ar[¼(:)]) is increasing in
the expected value of proﬁts and decreasing in the variance of proﬁts. r is the discount
factor and is constant over time and identical in both countries. C(IA;IB)is the adjust-
ment cost of capital. The proﬁt function of the ﬁrm is given by ¼(KA;KB;eA;eB).





The solution to this maximization is obtained by forming the Hamiltonian:
2H(U(¼(:));C(IA;IB);IA;IB) = e
¡rtU(¼(:)) ¡ C(IA;IB) ¡ IA ¡ IB¡
¸A(t)(IA) ¡ ¸B(t)(IA)
(3)

















Let ¹i = ¸iert. From (5)


































2 + (IB ¡ ¹)
2] (11)




dt = 1 + °(Ii ¡ ¹) (12)







¡1 ¡ ¹ (13)
At this stage we must specify a proﬁt function for the investing ﬁrm. We consider that cap-




is a function of the capital stock in country A and country B. The nominal proﬁt function
















¡ (wA + KA)eAq
A





1;k is output of a ﬁrm in industry k, producing in country i = A;B. Qi;k is the
aggregate demand in country i in industry k, and is equal to the sum of production of
ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2 in country i. Qi = qi
1 + qi
2. ei is the exchange rate in units of country
i’s currency per units of the investing ﬁrm’s currency. So, the ﬁrm’s proﬁts are given in
the currency of its home country. Ki is the stock of capital and is ﬁxed in the short-run.
wi, i=A, B is the price of factors in country i. We assume that industry k is oligopolis-
tic. Firm 1 maximizes its proﬁt making certain assumptions about the reaction of its
competitors in the industry. These assumptions are summarized in the derivative of the
demand function with respect to the aggregate demand,
@P(Qi)
@Qi .
























)eB ¡ (wB + KB)eB (16)
4²i is the elasticity of the aggregate demand in country i. In (15) and (16),
@P(Qi)
@Qi was mul-
tiplied by Qi=QiP(Qi), which yields the inverse of the elasticity of the aggregate demand.










Substituting (17) in the proﬁt function gives the optimum proﬁt given the capital stock
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¡ (wA + KA)eAq
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where the starred variables are the optimum outputs of ﬁrm 1 in country A and in country
B.
Finally, we adopt a mean-variance speciﬁcation for the ﬁrm’s function U(¼), which reﬂects
the assumption of risk aversion,
U(¼(:)) = E[¼(:)] ¡ ÁV ar[¼(:)] (19)
where E[.] and Var[.] are the expectation and the variance operators. Clearly, U(:) varies
positively with mean proﬁts and negatively with the variance of proﬁts. The derivative
of U(:) with respect to Ki in (13) is thus the derivative of the expected value of the proﬁt
minus the derivative of the variance of proﬁts. This speciﬁcation also has the advantage
of highlighting the role of the correlation between the exchange rates of country A and
country B. In eﬀect, suppose a ﬁrm has a total amount of assets to be invested (K)
that can be split between a number of foreign investments ri (i=1,...,n). Suppose also
that uncertainty is due to exchange rate risk (¾2
i). If the ﬁrm chooses to invest wi as a
proportion of its assets in each country (wi < 1;8i;
P
wi = 1) then the total expected







































where ½ij is the correlation coeﬃcient. A ﬁrm which is purely interested in maximizing
expected proﬁts should therefore invest only in the country or countries with the high-
est returns but a ﬁrm which is concerned with both maximizing proﬁts and minimizing
risk would exploit any correlation between returns which is less than one to reduce the
variance of the total return. A correlation coeﬃcient of 1 of course means that there are
no beneﬁts to diversiﬁcation between the two regions and only the region with the higher
return should receive any investment.










where ¼¤ = eA¼A¤
1 + eB¼B¤
1 . Diﬀerentiating (23) with respect to Ki and substituting the

















































i ´ V ar(ei). It should be noted that the sign of the expression involving Cov(ei;ej),
depends on the sign of the exchange rate covariance. Here, we implicitly assume that the
weight of investment in each location is wi =
Ii P





The impacts on investment of exchange rate volatility and correlation between exchange
rates can be shown by diﬀerentiating (24) with respect to the variance of ei and the co-















where q1;k;i is the production of ﬁrm 1 of industry k in country i. (27) is clearly negative
and unsurprising. Since we assume a risk- averse ﬁrm, volatility should have a negative
impact on investment. More interesting is the fact that the negative impact of volatility
is reduced when the ﬁrm’s market power increases. To simplify notation, we replace the
mark-up expression in (27) by its equivalent in terms of the Lerner index of market power.







The left-hand side of (28) is the Lerner index of market power, denoted L. Substituting













which is also clearly negative. Finally, we show that the impact of exchange rate correla-








¡1 ¡ 1][(1 ¡ Lj)
¡1 ¡ 1]q1;k;iq1;k;jdt (30)
Considering that Cov(ei;ej) = ½i;j¾2
i¾2
j, two cases can be characterised.
Case 1: ¡1 · ½i;j < 1. Risk diversiﬁcation can be achieved by relocating investment from
one country to the other, since exchange rates are either partially correlated or cancel
each other.
Case 2: ½i;j = 1. Exchange rates are perfectly correlated. There is little possibility for
risk diversiﬁcation. Investment location will be determined by other factors, e.g. rate of
return, market size, labour market conditions.
Finally, we can show that the derivative of (30) with respect to the Lerner index is
negative, suggesting that an increase in market power diminish the impact of exchange
rate correlation on investment.
7Table 1: Herﬁndahl index. UK. and European Union.
Industry UK European Union
Food and Kindred Products 0.30 0.16
Chemicals and Allied Products 0.24 0.24
Primary and Fabricated Metals 0.13 0.13
Machinery 0.14 0.15
Electrical and Electronic Equipments 0.19 0.24
Transportation Equipment 0.42 0.54
Other Manufacturing 0.14 0.14
2.2 Measures of concentration
The most appropriate measure of a ﬁrm’s market power is the Lerner index, which is
given by the ratio of price less marginal costs over price. As marginal costs are not
directly observable, a proxy for market power is generally used. Here, we use an industry-
wide measure of market power, the market Lerner index, deﬁned as the weighted sum
of individual ﬁrm Lerner indices, deﬁned in (28) above. The weights are ﬁrms’ market
shares. Assuming that ﬁrms engage in Cournot competition, the market Lerner index






The Herﬁndahl index has been shown to be a good measure of monopoly power, and will
be used in this paper as a proxy for market power.1 Herﬁndahl Indices can be constructed
from various measures of ﬁrm size, gross output per ﬁrm, value added per ﬁrm, number
of employees per ﬁrm. We use the share of value added at factor prices per ﬁrm as a mea-
sure of ﬁrm size. Eurostat data on value added at factor prices are more complete than
other measures of ﬁrm sizes. We construct a Herﬁndahl index for 7 two-digit industries
in the European Union for 1995, the obly data point available. For this reason, we will
assume in the empirical analysis of investment that the Herﬁndahl index is constant over
time. Eurostat data for the UK were available from 1995 to 2000. We used the average
over those ﬁve years as the constant Herﬁndahl Index for the UK. We prefer to use the
European Union Index as we see US ﬁrms making a location choice in order to serve the
Single Market at lowest cost and risk.
2.3 Measures of uncertainty
We have chosen a GARCH measure of exchange rate volatility. Since we are focusing
on FDI to two distinct countries, we need to understand the conditional distribution of
1See Kwoka (1998).
8a group of two variables, the sterling dollar exchange rate and the euro dollar exchange
rate. A number of studies have already extended the basic GARCH framework to a
multivariate context so that we may consider complete conditional covariance matrices,
Kraft and Engle (1982), Bollerslev, Engle and Wooldridge (1988), Hall, Miles and Taylor
(1990),Hall and Miles (1992), and Engle and Kroner(1995). Let us consider a set of n
variables Y that may be assumed to be generated by the following VAR process.
A(L)Yt = et (32)
This diﬀers from a conventional VAR model as we assume that
E[et] = 0 (33)
E[ete
0
t] = Ωt (34)
so that the covariance matrix is time varying. We then make the standard ARCH as-
sumption that this covariance matrix follows an autoregressive structure. Estimation of










and so standard maximum likelihood (or quasi maximum likelihood) procedures may be
applied. If we deﬁne the VECH operator in the usual way as a stacked vector of the lower
triangle of a symmetric matrix then we can represent the standard generalization of the
univariate GARCH model as
V ECH(Ωt) = C + A(L)V ECH(ete
0
t) + B(L)V ECH(Ωt¡1) (36)
where C is an (N(N+1)/2) vector and A and B are (N(N+1)/2)x(N(N+1)/2) matrices.
This general formulation presents a couple of drawbacks. First,(36) rapidly produces huge
numbers of parameters as N rises. For instance, for 1 lag in A and B and a 5 variable
system 465 parameters have to be estimated. So, beyond the simplest system (36) will
almost certainly be intractable. Second, without fairly complex restrictions on the sys-
tem the conditional covariance matrix cannot be guaranteed to be positive semi deﬁnite.
Much of the literature has thus focused on ﬁnding a parameterization which is both ﬂex-
ible enough to be useful and yet is also reasonably tractable.
One of the most popular formulations was ﬁrst proposed by Baba, Engle, Kraft and
Kroner, sometimes referred to as the BEKK(see Engle and Kroner(1993)) representation,
this takes the following form
9Table 2: Bivariate real and nominal exchange rate models.ei;t = Di1ei;t¡1 + Di2ej;t¡1 + ²t,
for i 6= j = 1;2
Nominal exchange rates Real exchange rates
Var Coeﬃcient t-stat Coeﬃcient t-Stat
D11 0.236038 1.56 0.626276 2.5
D12 1.022842 48.87 0.942173 46.4
D21 0.010908 0.08 0.253396 1.6
D22 0.991444 207.4 0.956215 73.5
A11 0.556973 7.61 0.142521 1.4
B11 0.878169 28.17 0.001000 0.0
C11 0.000719 2.93 0.018854 14.6
C12 -0.003493 5.35 0.011676 7.1
C22 0.000622 -0.65 0.000003 0.0
A22 0.288860 4.97 0.640873 3.8
















This formulation guarantees positive semi deﬁniteness of the covariance matrix almost
surely and reduces the number of parameters considerably. We deﬁne a pair of simple
ﬁrst order autoregessions for the log of the real exchange rate, ei;t i=1,2, and estimate a
bivariate BEKK model of the conditional covariance and the conditional correlation be-
tween the real dollar-sterling rate and the real dollar-euro rate. The A and B matrices are
restricted to be diagonal, maximum likelihood estimation. Consumer price indices were
used to obtain the real exchange rates. Results are presented in Table 2. D11 and D12
are the constant and lagged dependent variable coeﬃcients in the sterling dollar equation
and D21 and D22 are the corresponding coeﬃcients in the euro dollar equation. Aij, Bij
and Cij are elements of the matrices deﬁned in (37).
We include results for the correlation of both the nominal and the real euro dollar and
sterling dollar rates, although we use the latter in our analysis. The nominal correlation
was relatively high between the early 1970s and the mid 1990s, and then dropped for a
period, albeit to levels seen in the early 1980s. The correlation returned toward its histor-
ical average in the early part of the current decade. the correaltion of the real exchange
rates is more stable over time and has perhaps been rising in recent years. It is clear
from this graph that the real euro exchange rate is strongly connected to the ral sterling
exchange rate against the dollar.
10Figure 1: Correlation between real sterling dollar and real euro dollar exchange rates.
1973-2001





0.8 Real correlation 




0.8 Nominal correlation 
3 Econometric analysis
We assume that US ﬁrms invest in Europe and choose between locations to serve the
overall European market. Our theory suggests that in the long run the level of FDI in
each of the locations will depend upon the cost of capital (CC), their expected proﬁtabil-
ity and the volatility if the exchange rate (Vol) between them. We presume that expected
proﬁtability can be indexed by current returns (RR) and by the level of the real exchange
rate. If the real exchange rate (REAL) in one location rises then the proﬁtability of that
location relative to its competitors can be expected to decline. Hence, we estimate the
long run equation
FDIi = F(REALI;RRi;V ol;CC;::) (38)
3.1 Data
Annual data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) survey of US direct in-
vestment abroad were used in the empirical analysis. The countries covered are the UK
and the following members of the single currency, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and
the Netherlands. This group of Euro Area countries had eﬀectively ﬁxed exchange rates
over the period 1982-2000. They can therefore be treated as the same location and aggre-
gated together. For the sake of simplicity they will be denoted ”Euro Area” throughout
11the paper. Seven two-digit manufacturing industries were considered, Food and Kindred
Products, Chemicals and Allied Products, Primary and Fabricated Metals, Machinery,
Electrical and Electronic Equipments, Transportation Equipment, Other manufacturing.
Data on direct investment by country and by industry are available only on a historical-
cost basis and for foreign aﬃliates in which US ﬁrms have direct or indirect ownership or
control of more than 10 per cent of voting securities. Year-to-year changes in the stock of
FDI include net capital outﬂows between the U.S. parent and its aﬃliate, inter-company
debt and reinvested earnings. Valuation adjustments, e.g., exchange rate adjustments,
price changes and other capital gains and losses, are also included in year-to-year changes.
Net income reported by aﬃliates in year t divided by investment in the previous year was
taken as a measure of the rate of return on investment in year t ¡ 1. Net income is gross
proﬁt net of local corporate taxes. Real data were obtained by deﬂating the original data
by the U.S. Consumer Price Index. Data are available from 1982 to 2001. The sample
period for estimation, however, was restricted to the period 1982-1998, since in 1999 a
change in the industrial classiﬁcation of Electrical and Electronic Equipments created a
break in the series. This data set naturally calls for panel data analysis by 7 industries
and over 18 time periods.
3.2 Results
Our theoretical framework suggests that the change in FDI into a location will depend
upon the proﬁtability of that location and the risks associated with it.2 Adjustment to
long run changes in driving variables such as proﬁtability is unlikely to be immediate,
and hence any model we estimate has to take into account the dynamics of adjustment.
Following the shareholder’s perspective on investment adopted in our theoretical spec-
iﬁcation, the long-run relationship includes the rate of return, the cost of capital, the
exchange rate risk and the correlation between exchange rates. We estimate the following
equation:










j;t;½i;j;t) + °i;k + ui;k;t
(39)
for i 6= j= UK, Euro Area. FDIi;k;t is the log of real US FDI in industry k in location
i, RRi;k;t the real rate of return reported by aﬃliates in industry k in location i. USLRt
is the U.S. 10 years real interest rate and was included as a proxy for the cost of capital.
RRXt is the real sterling/ euro exchange rate. ¾2
i;t ´ var[ei;t] is the GARCH estimate of
the variance of the exchange rate in location i, ei. ½i;j;t ´ corr[ei;t;ej;t] is the GARCH
estimate of the correlation between the exchange rate in location i and the exchange rate
2This can be seen by diﬀerentiating (24) with respect to time.
12in location j. °i;k are the individual eﬀects and ui;k;t is the error term. To simplify the
notation of (39) we use 5(FDIi;k;t;FDIj;k;t;RRi;k;t;RRj;k;t;USLRt;RRXt;¾2
i;t;¾2
j;t;½i;j;t)
to represent the dynamics of the variables in the brackets.
In (39) the lagged dependent variable also appears as explanatory variable. In this case,
it has been shown that the error terms are correlated with the values of the regressors.
Maximum-likelihood and generalised least-square estimators are biased when the number
of individuals N is large and the number of time periods T short3. We thus adopt the
generalized method of moments (GMM) developed by Arrellano and Bond (1991), who
provide an eﬃcient estimator of dynamic panels whith large N and short T. Estimation
and hypotheses testing were conducted using PcGive10.0
We expect increases in the rate of return to have a positive impact on FDI. The estimated
coeﬃcient of RRt should be positive. Other things equal, a higher price of capital tends
to depress investment, so, the coeﬃcient of USLRt should be negative. Since we assume
ﬁrms are risk- averse, the coeﬃcient of the relative exchange rate variance is expected
to be negative. The implications of the sign of the coeﬃcient of the correlation were
presented in Section 2 above. The sign of the real sterling euro exchange rate is expected
to be negative, or not signiﬁcant. In eﬀect, over the period 1982-2000, total sales of
goods and services produced an average of 94 per cent of the proﬁts of UK aﬃliates in
manufacturing industries, of which 60 per cent were domestic sales. An average of 29 per
cent of total sales was exported to all countries excluding the U.S. Although the BEA
does not specify which European countries UK aﬃliates export to, an average of 85 per
cent of exports by European aﬃliates was destined to the European Union. We can then
infer that between 1982 and 2000, most of the exports of UK aﬃliates were bound to
the European Union. If we assume that these exports amounted to 85 per cent, we can
also infer that less than a quarter of the proﬁts made by UK aﬃliates derive from their
exports to the European Union.
For a general model, the results reported in Table 3, column[1], are generally poor. The
coeﬃcient of FDIuk;t¡2, is only signiﬁcant at the 10 per cent level, and the signs of several
coeﬃcients are not sensible. The rate of return in the UK should have a positive-rather
than negative- impact on inward FDI in the UK. Analogously, the coeﬃcient of ¾uk;t¡2
should be negative, and not positive as reported in column [1], whereas the coeﬃcient of
¾eu;t¡2 should be positive. An increase in the volatility of the euro dollar exchange rate
would probably make the UK more attractive then the EU for outward US investment.
The results of column [1] indicate that the opposite would be more likely. The sign of the
real cross-exchange rate in column [1] is positive, indicating that an increase in the ster-
ling euro exchange rate should raise investment in the UK. The cost of capital, USLRt¡2
was not found signiﬁcant.
FDIeu;t¡2 has a positive sign, suggesting that US ﬁrms may not regard Europe as a mar-
ket segmented into Euro Area and non-Euro Area. A positive sign indicates that US
3See Hsiao (2003), chapter 4.
13Table 3: GMM estimates of US foreign direct investment in the UK. Sample period:1982-
1998.
[1] [2]





USLRt¡2 0:0157985 1.51 ¡0:327862¤¤ -2.19
RRXt¡2 0:0293338¤¤ 2.54 0:0443337¤ 1.77
¾uk;t¡2 0:143071¤¤ 4.02 ¡0:367782¤¤ -2.17
¾eu;t¡2 ¡0:0103230¤¤ -4.11 0:696059¤¤ 2.16






∆RRuk;t ¡0:000149372 -1.41 0:00194151¤¤ 2.15
∆RRuk;t¡1 0:0004093¤¤ 3.03 ¡0:000454746¤¤ -2.02
∆RRuk;t¡2 6:81163e ¡ 005¤¤ 1.71
∆RReu;t 0:000197497¤¤ 4.32
∆RReu;t¡1 7:60663e ¡ 005¤¤ 2.20
∆RRXt ¡0:0077929¤ -1.94
∆RRXt¡1 ¡0:0653882¤¤ -2.64
∆¾uk 0:0253299¤¤ 3.82 ¡0:0788412¤¤ -1.97





Model 1:¾=0.7242401,¾2=0.5245238 RSS=7.8678566788,TSS=3.207809963,no. of obser-




(joint):Â2(24)=1180. [0.000], Wald (dummy):Â2(19)=1180. [0.000], Wald (time):Â2(13)=1180. [0.000],
Sargan test:Â2(104)=7.992e-016 [1.000], AR(1) test:N(0,1)=-1.837 [0.066], AR(2) test:N(0,1)= 1.815
[0.069]
Model 2:¾=1.696882,¾2=2.87941, RSS=80.623477618,TSS=3.3268586754, no. of observations=59,no.
of parameters=31,Transformation used:none, Level instruments:Dummies,lfdiukeu(-2),rrukeu(-
2),lrukeurx(-2),ruslr(-2), rcorr(-2),rvareu(-2),rvaruk(-2),drvaruk,drvaruk(-1),drruk, drruk(-1),drruk(-
2),Gmm(dfdiukeu,3,99).Wald (joint):Â2(12)=13.22 [0.353] Wald (dummy):Â2(19)=13.22 [0.827],Wald
(time):Â2(13)=13.22 [0.431], Sargan test:Â2(104)=-4.463e-014 [1.000],AR(1) test:N(0,1)=1.842 [0.066],
AR(2) test:N(0,1)=1.483 [0.138].
** and * denote a diagnostic test signiﬁcant at 5% and 10%, respectively. For Wald, Sargan, and AR(.)
tests, the p-value is given.
14ﬁrms increase their investment in the UK following an rise in FDI into the Euro Area.
This result is consistent with the negative sign of the rate of return in the Euro Area
(RReu;t¡2), as it indicates that an increase in the rate of return in the Euro Area would
relocate FDI from the UK to the Euro Zone. Finally, we note that the exchange rate
correlation has a positive and signiﬁcant sign. This positive coeﬃcient indicates that US
FDI in the UK increases as exchange rates become more correlated. A perfect positive
correlation diminishes risk diversiﬁcation opportunities, as both rates move in the same
direction. Investment location would then be determined by other factors, e.g. higher
rate of return or more ﬂexible labour market. This result is quite robust to changes in
model speciﬁcation, since correlation has a positive coeﬃcient in column [1] and column
[2].
A general to speciﬁc nested procedure produced the results presented in Table 3, column
[2]. The opposite signs of FDIuk;t¡2 and FDIeu;t¡2, the negative sign of the Euro Area
rate of return and the poor signiﬁcance of some dynamic terms in the general model,
lead us to estimate US FDI in the UK as a ratio of US FDI in the Euro Area. This
speciﬁcation not only generates the best results, but also emphasizes the role of location
choice of US ﬁrms in Europe. We replaced the country speciﬁc rates of return RRuk;k;t¡2
and RReu;k;t¡2 by the ratio of the former over the latter, RRRk;t¡2. Similarly, we replaced
the dependent variable ∆FDIuk;k;t¡2 by the log of the ratio of real US FDI in industry k
(RFDIk;t)in the UK industry k to real FDI in the Euro Area in industry k (RFDIk;t).
The impact of the correlation of the euro dollar and sterling dollar exchange rates is pos-
itive and signiﬁcant, indicating that an increase in realtive volatility would reduce the
share of FDI located in the UK. Conversely, an increase in the correlation of these two
rates, as would result from EMU membership, would raise the shares of US FDI lo0cated
in the UK4 All coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant and correctly signed, except the coeﬃcient of
RRXt¡2, which is positive but not signiﬁcant at the 5 per cent level. We expected the
sterling euro exchange rate to have a negative impact on FDI or possibly no impact at all.
As mentioned above, domestic sales rather than exports to the European Union are the
main source of income of UK aﬃliates. Exports represented a larger share of total sales
in some industries over the sample period. UK aﬃliates in Machinery and Chemicals,
for instance, exported on average 40 and 28 per cent of their total sales, respectively.
However, in the remaining industries included in our sample, the average share of exports
was less than the 23 per cent average share of the manufacturing industry as a whole.
Table 3 lends support to our theoretical assumptions about US ﬁrms’ attitude to risk.
U.S. ﬁrms investing in the UK tend to be risk-averse and decrease their investment when
the relative volatility of the dollar-pound exchange rate increases. On the contrary, rises
in the volatility of the euro dollar exchange rate tend to divert US investment from the
Euro Area to the UK. The coeﬃcient of ¾uk;t¡2=-0.37 and the coeﬃcient of ¾eu;t¡2=0.696.
Finally, Table 4 corroborates our ﬁnding that increases in exchange rate correlation lead
4Membership of EMU would mean that the correlation of the euro and the sterling against the dollar
would be identically one. However, the correlation of the real exchange rates against the dollar would
rise, but it does not have to reach this level.
15Table 4: GMM estimates of US foreign direct investment in the Euro Area. Sample
period:1982-1998.
[1] [2]
Variable Coeﬃcient t-value Coeﬃcient t-value
FDIeu;t¡2 ¡0:346331¤¤ -3.26 ¡0:340736¤¤ -3.24
RReu;t¡2 5:96 ¤ 10¡5 1.28 7:46334 ¤ 10¡5¤ 1.81
RRXt¡2 0.00784355 0.69
USLRt¡2 ¡0:122796¤¤ -3.05 ¡0:123328¤¤ -3.04
½t¡2 -0.0338988 -1.52 ¡0:0438151¤ -1.80
¾eu;t¡2 ¡0:0112264¤¤ -6.39 ¡0:0120693¤¤ -4.29
∆FDIeu;t¡1 0.0232151 0.79 0.0145616 0.357
∆CPIeu;t 0.00491248 1.58 0:00501553¤ 1.76
∆USLRt ¡0:0884616¤¤ -2.54 ¡0:0816780¤¤ -2.42
∆½t ¡0:0461836¤¤ -2.48 ¡0:0464129¤¤ -2.59
[1] ¾=0.5113763, ¾2=0.2615057, RSS=8.3681814578, TSS=2.218376681,no. of observations=60, no. of param-
eters=28,Transformation used:orthogonal deviations. Level instruments:Dummies, dlfdieu(-1),lrfdieu(-2),ruslr(-2),
rcorr(-2),rvareu(-2),rrreu(-2),dlcpieu,lcpieu,druslr,drcorr, Gmm(dlfdieu,3,99).Wald (joint):Â2(9)=118.1 [0.000] , Wald
(dummy):Â2(19)=118.1 [0.000], Wald (time): Â2(13)=118.1 [0.000] ,Sargan test:Â2(105)=7.534e-015 [1.000], AR(1)
test:N(0,1)=-1.614 [0.107],AR(2) test:N(0,1)=1.345 [0.179]. [2]:¾=0.5366653,¾2=0.2880097,RSS=8.9283005972,
TSS=2.218376681,no. of observations=60,no. of parameters=29, Transformation used:orthogonal deviations,Level
instruments:Dummies, dlfdieu(-1),lrfdieu(-2),ruslr(-2),rcorr(-2),rvareu(-2),rrreu(-2), dlcpieu,lcpieu,druslr,drcorr,lrukeurx(-
2),Gmm(dlfdieu,3,99), Wald (joint):Â2(10)=199.4 [0.000], Wald (dummy):Â2(19)=199.4 [0.000], Wald (time):Â2(13)=199.4
[0.000] Sargan test:Â2(105)=1.176e-014 [1.000], AR(1) test:N(0,1)=-1.578 [0.115], AR(2) test:N(0,1)=1.239 [0.215].
** and * denote a diagnostic test signiﬁcant at 5% and 10%, respectively. For Wald, Sargan, and AR(.) tests, the p-value
is given.
to a relocation of investment from the Euro Area to the UK. Table 4 presents the results
of the estimation of equation (39) for US direct investment in the Euro Area. Two sets
of results are shown. In column [1], the sterling euro exchange rate is included in the
long-run relationship, following (39). However, it was not found signiﬁcant, and equation
(39) was subsequently re-estimated excluding RRXt¡2 . Column [2] shows the results of
this alternative estimation. In both cases the coeﬃcient of the exchange rate correlation is
negative. It is signiﬁcant in column [2] but not in column [1]. Removing the sterling euro
exchange rate from the long-run relationship improves the signiﬁcance of the correlation
and of rate of return on FDI in the Euro Area. The euro dollar exchange rate volatility
and the U.S. interest rate have negative signs, as anticipated, and are signiﬁcant at 5 per
cent.
The econometric analysis of US FDI in the UK and the Euro Area presented above allows
16us to conclude that US ﬁrms investing in Europe tend to be risk- averse, and that their
preferred location tend to be the UK. As exchange rate correlation converges towards 1,
exchange rate risk diversiﬁcation becomes a weaker determinant of location whilst other
factors like rate of return become more relevant. There is ample evidence in the literature
that market size and labour market ﬂexibility, factor productivity, ﬁscal competitiveness,
among others, are strong determinants in the choice of FDI location.
3.3 Market power
Departures from perfect competition alter quite signiﬁcantly the relationship between in-
vestment and uncertainty. Caballero (1991), for instance, demonstrates that the higher
the mark-up the less responsive investment levels to changes in price uncertainty. Simu-
lating his model for several values of mark- up, Caballero (1991) found that investment
can be practically independent of the level of uncertainty. There is also empirical evidence
that US ﬁrms with market power tend to absorb exchange rate changes into their prices
and their mark-up. Campa and Goldberg (1995) show that high mark-up ﬁrms are less
responsive to changes in exchange rate volatility than low mark-up ﬁrms. We show in this
section that these results may not be easily extended to foreign investment by US ﬁrms.
Our sample consists of two groups comprising low Herﬁndahl industries and high Herﬁnd-
ahl industries, respectively. In the UK the latter is composed by Food, Chemicals, Electri-
cal Equipment, and Transportation Equipment. Primary Metals, Machinery and Equip-
ment, and Other Manufacturing Industries form the group of low Herﬁndahl industries.
In the Euro Area, Chemicals, Electrical Equipment and Transportation Equipment are
high- Herﬁndahl industries, whilst Food, Primary Metals, Machinery and Equipment, and
Other Manufacturing Industries can be considered low-Herﬁndahl industries.It should be
noted that the Herﬁndahl Index of the Euro Area is an aggregate measure of concen-
tration over the European Union, and thus covers more countries than the Euro Area.
In particular, it includes the United Kingdom. For this reason, we chose to classify the
industries according to the European Herﬁndahl Index.
The criterion used for splitting the sample is the higher benchmark value of the Herﬁndahl
index published in the US Department of Justice Merger Guidelines. Two critical thresh-
olds for measuring industrial concentration are considered in the guideline, H=0.10 and
H=0.18. All the industries in our sample have Herﬁndahl indices greater than 0.10. We
then split our sample into groups of industries with Herﬁndahl indices lower and greater
than 0.18, respectively.
We test the equality of the coeﬃcients of the variances for the two groups of industries
considered above, in order to analyse the impact of market power on risk aversion. We
split the data on conditional variances in accordance to the level of the Herﬁndahl index.
Equation (39) then becomes,






¾uk;t¡2 High ¡0:250678¤¤ -2.20








¾=1.555853,¾2=2.420679,RSS=65.35833463, TSS=3.3268586754,no. of observations=59,no. of parame-
ters=32,Transformation used: none.Level instruments:Dummies,drruk,drruk(-1),drruk(-2),rcorr(-2),ruslr(-2),rrukeu(-
2),lrukeurx(-2),varuk1(-2),varuk2(-2),rvareu(-2),lfdiukeu(-2),dvaruk1(-1), dvaruk2(-1),Gmm(dfdiukeu,3,99).Wald
(joint):Â2(13)=18.47 [0.141], Wald (dummy):Â2(19)=18.47 [0.491],Wald (time):Â2(13)=18.47 [0.141], Sargan test:Â2(104)=-
3.363e-014 [1.000],AR(1) test:N(0,1)=2.280 [0.023], AR(2) test:N(0,1)=1.762 [0.078]
** and * denote a diagnostic test signiﬁcant at 5% and 6%, respectively. y denotes a diagnostic test signiﬁcant at 10%. For
Wald, Sargan, and AR(.) tests, the p-value is given.














eu;t;½uk;eu;t) + °i;k + uk;t
(40)
where ¾uk;t¡2;H = ¾2
uk;t¡2 ¤ ±H and ¾2
uk;t¡2;L = ¾2
uk;t¡2 ¤ (1 ¡ ±H). ±H = 1; if H > 0:18
and ±H = 0; otherwise. ¾uk;t¡2;H can be interpreted as the variance associated with high
Herﬁndahl industries in the UK and ¾uk;t¡2;L the variance associated with low Herﬁnd-
ahl industries in the UK. We then test the hypothesis that the two variances are equal.
Results are reported in Table 5. All coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 5 per cent and 6
per cent levels. The coeﬃcients of the split variances are negative conﬁrming our earlier
results that the volatility of the sterling dollar exchange rate has a negative impact on
investment in all industries in the UK.
We expect the coeﬃcient of ¾uk;t¡2;H, ¾uk;t¡2;L and their respective dynamic terms to be
statistically diﬀerent. The estimation is reported in Table 5.The test of equality of the
coeﬃcients of the two variances is accepted at the 5 per cent level. We cannot then con-
clude that FDI into highly concentrated industries in the UK and FDI in less concentrated
industries are distinctly aﬀected by exchange risk. Moreover, we note that the coeﬃcient
of the variance associated with high Herﬁndahl industries is bigger than that associated
18with low Herﬁndahl industries.
Although it is theoretically clear that uncertainty aﬀects the investment decision by the
ﬁrm in diﬀerent ways depending upon mark ups and the degree of concentration, the
result does not necessarily apply to FDI, which is an ownernship decision and not nec-
essarily a decision to invest in physical or intellectual capital. A multinational ﬁrm may
reduce its FDI in a location at the same time as the foreign based subsidiary increases its
investment in capital equipment ﬁnancing it by borrowing on the local market. Hence it is
not surprising that it is possible to reject the proposition that market structure aﬀects the
role of uncertainty in the FDI decision whilst accepting that it has a role in the desicion
to invest in productive capital.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have sought to isolate the impact of exchange rate risk on US FDI in
Europe, emphasizing the interaction between exchange rate uncertainty, exchange rate
correlation and market power. We constructed a model based on the hypothesis that
risk-averse ﬁrms would attempt to reduce the impact of uncertainty on their investment
portfolio by exploiting correlations bewteen exchange rates in alternative locations. We
also showed that market power reduces the negative impact of uncertainty on investment.
We test our theoretical model on US foreign direct investment in Europe, using a panel
of seven two-digit industries. We ﬁnd that exchange rate uncertainty in the Euro Area
and in the UK has a strong negative eﬀect on FDI. There is strong evidence that the
correlation between the sterling dollar exchange rate and the euro dollar exchange rate
inﬂuences location decisions of US ﬁrms in Europe. In particular, we found evidence that,
as the exchange rate correlation move towards 1, US ﬁrms tend to divert their investment
from the Euro Area to the UK.
Finally, our results show that the degree of industrial concentration has little inﬂuence
on the impact of exchange rate volatility on US FDI in Europe. Using the degree of
industrial concentration as a proxy for monopoly power, we found that FDI in industries
with low monopoly power is not diversely aﬀected by exchange rate volatility than FDI
in highly concentrated industries.
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20Data Appendix
The data on US outward direct investment and data on aﬃliates of US ﬁrms abroad were
obtained from the Survey of Current Business of the Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1982-
2001. These data include FDI at historical cost, the net income reported by aﬃliates, total,
local sales, sales to the US and sales to ”other” countries. The sterling dollar exchange
rate and the US Consumer price Index were obtained from the OECD Main Economic
Indicators and the euro dollar exchange rate from the IFS (1999 onwards). Prior to 1999,
the euro dollar exchange rate was linked to ECU. Data used for the construction of the
Herﬁndahl Index were obtained from Eurostat NewCronos database. The UK consumer
price index is given by the ONS, Economic Trends.
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